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ABSTRACT 
 
Discussions of public diplomacy in recent years have paid a growing amount of attention to 
networks. This network perspective is understood to provide insights into various issues of 
public diplomacy, such as its effects, credibility, reputation, identity and narratives. This 
paper applies the network idea to analyse China’s Confucius Institutes initiative. It 
understands Confucius Institutes as a global network and argues that this network structure 
has potential implications for the operation of public and cultural diplomacy that are perhaps 
underestimated in existing accounts of Chinese cultural diplomacy. In particular, it is noted 
that the specific setup of Confucius Institutes requires the engagement of local stakeholders, 
in a way that is less centralised and more networked than comparable cultural diplomacy 
institutions. At the same time, the development of a more networked for of public cultural 
diplomacy is challenged in practice by both practical issues and the configuration of China’s 
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state-centric public diplomacy system informed by the political constitution of the Chinese 
state.  
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Introduction  
 
The Chinese culture belongs not only to the Chinese, but to the whole world.  
(Chinese President Hu Jintao, address to the Australian Federal Parliament, October 2003). 
 
In 2002, the Chinese government began to consider setting up institutions to promote Chinese 
language and culture overseas. One of the key elements of this policy of promoting Chinese 
language and culture internationally has been Confucius Institutes (CI). Modeled on 
institutions such as the British Council, France’s Alliance Française and Germany’s Goethe 
Institutes, the growth of China’s Confucius Institutes has been one of the most important 
developments in 21st century public diplomacy. Between 2004 and 2012, China set up over 
900 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in 108 countries to promote Chinese 
language and culture. China now has the third largest number of national cultural institutes 
operating in other countries, after the United Kingdom and France. 
 
Despite the rapid worldwide growth of Confucius Institutes, there is a lack of detailed analysis 
of their roles and functions, with a common assumption being that they are simply 
propaganda arms of the Chinese party-state. The American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP) issued a statement in June 2014 expressing concern about the presence of 
Confucius Institutes on North American campuses, arguing that ‘Confucius Institutes function 
as an arm of the Chinese state and are allowed to ignore academic freedom’ (AAUP 2014). 
Such concerns find echoes in the academic literature on Confucius Institutes, with Brady 
(2008: 159) describing Confucius Institutes as ‘China’s foreign propagandists’, while Niquet 
(2012: 81) has argued that Confucius Institutes are ‘a part of efforts to modernize China’s 
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propaganda apparatus’. Critiquing the decision of the University of Chicago to establish a 
Confucius Institute on its campus, the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins argued that through 
such links, U.S. universities ‘have become engaged in the political and propaganda efforts of 
a foreign government in a way that contradicts the values of free inquiry and human welfare 
to which they are otherwise committed’ (Sahlins 2013).  
 
This paper adopts a different approach, arguing that the rise of Confucius Institutes can be 
understood as occurring at the intersection of three debates, which have been of vital 
importance both internationally and within China: the significance of the concept of ‘soft 
power’ in international relations; the role of cultural diplomacy as an arm of public diplomacy 
and international communication; and the implications of new forms of network 
communications. In doing so, we note the inherent tension that arises in public diplomacy as 
to ‘whether government-sponsored activities are manipulative “propaganda” or valid “public 
diplomacy”’ (Zaharna 2004: 219). While our perspective is not a ‘neutralist’ one, presenting 
propaganda as a necessary evil in a complex global system of states (Taylor 2011), we would 
argue that an excessive focus upon the distinctiveness of China’s form of government vis-à-
vis other nations that engage in such public diplomacy on a large scale can obscure the degree 
to which the rise of Confucius Institutes is also associated with innovations within the field of 
public diplomacy, which have implications for its practice around the world.  
 
This paper focuses on Confucius Institutes, which operate primarily through face-to-face 
interactions, and on cultural diplomacy rather than mass media or networked communications. 
At the same time, it aims to illustrate ways in which these Institutes facilitate message 
exchanges and information flows, and can demonstrate a networked communication strategy 
in action, which involves the co-creation of credibility, mastering narratives, and identities by 
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using - rather than simply disseminating - information (Zaharna 2010). Drawing upon case 
studies of Confucius Institutes in Australia and Germany, this paper discusses the network 
structure of Confucius Institutes, their network synergies and network strategy. It also 
considers the extent to which their success in achieving public diplomacy objectives is based 
around building relationships, identifying potential synergies between CIs and their host 
institutions, and incorporating diversity and flexibility into their everyday operations.  
 
The paper draws upon a series of interviews conducted by the researchers with Managers and 
Directors of Confucius Institutes in Australia and Germany during 2009-12, which coincided 
with site visits to these Institutes. While sources have been anonymised in order to maintain 
confidentiality, interviews took place with the Directors of five Australian CIs, all of which 
were in the elite ‘Group of Eight’ universities. In Germany, interviews and site visits were 
conducted with Directors/Managers of five Confucius Institutes, at universities that all had a 
Department of Sinology or China Studies, and two of which are a part of the German Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research’s Excellence Initiative. Information on the interviews 
conducted is provided in Appendix 1.   
 
The paper outlines these core debates, and considers the role, functions and future of 
Confucius Institutes through in-depth case studies of Confucius Institutes in Australia and 
Germany, particularly those established in partnership with host universities.  These two 
countries provide useful sites for case studies as both countries have strong and fast-growing 
economic relations with China. Germany is China’s largest trading partner in the European 
Union, and China is Germany’s second largest trading partner after the United States, while 
China has now surpassed the United States and Japan as Australia’s largest trading partner. 
These close economic relations, driven by high-technology manufacturing in the German case 
and minerals, energy and agriculture in the Australian case, have a variety of cultural and 
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other spillovers, including growth in tourism, research collaboration, and educational 
exchanges. The two countries also have important differences that range from language to 
history, geography, foreign policy orientation and population composition, which inform their 
relations with China. For example, Germany has had a formal presence in China dating back 
to the 1860s, although the number of people of Chinese descent in Germany today is not high. 
By contrast, Australia had little formal contact with China prior to the 1970s, but has a large 
Chinese-Australian population, with about 5 per cent of Australians having some form of 
Chinese ancestry (including people of Taiwanese, Hong Kong and Macau backgrounds) (ABS 
2012).  
 
Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy  
 
China’s commitment to bolstering its connections with the rest of the world has been a strong 
feature of its economic and foreign policies since 1978, after the death of Mao Zedong and the 
rise to power of Deng Xiaoping. Medeiros (2009) has argued that the concept of a ‘peaceful 
rise’ has a strong basis in China’s international behaviour, reflecting both the sense that strong 
international links are advantageous to China’s rise as an economic power in the world, and 
the sense that China has a historic mission to restore its status as a leading regional and global 
power, after the long history of depredations at the hands of foreign powers and the relative 
isolation of the Mao years. There is also the need to counter negative perceptions in the 
international community that the rise of China constitutes a threat to other nations, whether 
through concerns about its enhanced military power, or its growing economic significance as 
measured through trade and foreign investment (Broomfield 2003).  
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The concept of soft power has had considerable influence in China. First proposed by the 
Harvard University international relations theorist Joseph Nye, soft power refers to ‘the ability 
to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments’; it ‘arises from the 
attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas, and policies’ (Nye 2004: x), and ‘rests on 
the ability to shape the preferences of others’ (Nye 2004: 5). For Nye, ‘soft power’ is 
associated with culture and values, in contrast to the ‘hard power’ of military force or 
economic might. Soft power initiatives are thus an important element of a nation’s public 
diplomacy, or ‘a country’s engagement and communication with foreign publics’ (Wang 2011: 
3) and the promotion of national interests in international arenas.  Cull (2008: 32-35) has 
observed that the practice of public diplomacy can be divided into five elements that he refers 
to as: 
 
1. Listening: collecting information on international opinions, whether by legal or covert 
means i.e. spying and intelligence gathering; 
2. Advocacy: promoting particular policies, ideas or interests to foreign publics, 
typically through one’s own embassies in other countries; 
3. Cultural diplomacy: promoting a nation’s cultural resources overseas and/or 
facilitating cultural transmission abroad; 
4. Exchange diplomacy: promoting reciprocal exchanges of people with other nations 
e.g. as students; 
5. International broadcasting: the use of news bureaus, radio and television broadcasting, 
and Internet communication to engage with foreign publics.  
 
Although the soft power concept was first designed as a guide for U.S. foreign policy 
strategies (Sparks 2014), it has had considerable influence in China. One reason for growing 
interest in China with the soft power concept has been the manner in which it addresses the 
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apparent contradiction between China’s growing economic centrality and its relative lack of 
influence in international relations (Ding 2008; Wang 2011; Blanchard and Liu 2012; Li and 
Hong 2012). Rawnsley has observed that ‘China has embraced the concepts of soft power and 
public diplomacy with an enthusiasm rarely seen in other parts of the world’ (Rawnsley 2012: 
126). Brown (2010) has associated the growing interest in soft power in China with the rise of 
concepts such as ‘peaceful rise’, ‘peaceful development’ and a ‘Harmonious World’ among 
the Chinese Communist Party leadership in the 2000s, while Cabestan (2010: 3) has observed 
that ‘the key objective of this new discourse has been to change the outside perception of 
China for the better, and build a positive image of China’s contribution to the world’. 
 
Public diplomacy has been seen in China as a means of countering the ‘China threat’ thesis, 
by projecting images of the ‘real China’ internationally, promoting a favourable image of 
China in other nations, and projecting China’s national interests in international relations (Qiu 
2009; Zhang 2009; Zhao 2012). China has invested heavily in cultural diplomacy over the last 
decade through arts and cultural exchanges, Confucius Institutes, the very large numbers of 
Chinese students abroad, growth in the number of students from other countries studying in 
China, and the creation of foreign language services for China Central Television (CCTV), 
China Radio International (CRI) and the Xinhua News Agency. The hosting of the 2008 
Olympics in Beijing as well as the 2010 Shanghai Expo could also be seen as exercises in 
cultural diplomacy and the projection of Chinese soft power throughout the world (Rawnsley 
2009; Xin 2009; Brown 2010; Huang 2012).  
 
At the same time, China possesses a significant problem in projecting its soft power through 
public diplomacy, arising from the perceived lack of distance between its media and cultural 
institutions and the government, in a one-party state that is seen as authoritarian by other 
nations. The perception of government control over the output of CCTV, the Xinhua News 
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Agency or Chinese cinema constitutes an important barrier to the capacity of such institutions 
to have international influence. Cull has observed that ‘like all forms of communication, the 
effectiveness of each form of public diplomacy hinges on credibility … international 
broadcasters know that the impression of an editorial connection to government runs counter 
to credibility [and] cultural organisations are able to flourish in places where a formal arm of 
the state would have no credibility’ (Cull 2008: 34-35). An example of the problems China 
has faced in this regard is seen with the understanding of propaganda. In China, the concept 
has historically had a relatively neutral connotation, akin to terms such as publicity or public 
relations, whereas in the West it is ‘associated with manipulation and … implies the secret 
exercise of power that is beyond our immediate control’ (Rawnsley 2000: 69). Sparks (2014) 
has observed that perceptions of a lack of government transparency and media freedom 
constitute barriers to greater recognition of China as an emergent international leader, and the 
significance of such negatives is borne out in popular indices of ‘soft power’ such as those 
developed by the U.K.-based Institute for Government (McClory 2010).  
 
Public Diplomacy and Networks 
 
One of the major discussions in public diplomacy in recent years has been around the 
significance of networked approaches to public diplomacy. The concept of networks has been 
the subject of a growing debate in the public diplomacy literature (Brown 2010; Cowan and 
Arsenault 2008; Hocking 2005; Hocking et. al. 2012; Zaharna 2005, 2007, 2010; Zaharna et. 
al. 2013). Hocking (2005, 2008) has argued that there now exists ‘two worlds’ of public 
diplomacy: the traditional hierarchical approach, centered on intergovernmental relations and 
top-down communication; and the network-based approach, where ‘public diplomacy [is] one 
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facet of an environment in which international policy is increasingly conducted through 
complex policy networks’ (Hocking 2008: 64). The network model of public diplomacy is 
seen by its advocates as providing ‘a fundamentally different picture of how diplomacy works 
in the twenty-first century’ (Hocking 2005: 37), emphasising horizontal communciation as 
well as multidirectional flows and exchange of information.  
 
The two models of public diplomacy derive from different models of media and 
communication. The traditional approach draws from the mass communications tradition and 
the sender-message-receiver model, being based upon on what Zaharna has described as 
‘carefully crafted messages disseminated via mass media vehicles to a target audience with 
the goal of changing attitudes or behavior’ (Zaharna 2010: 94). Publics in this setting are 
understood as the receivers of messages and images from the ‘sending’ nation, rather than as 
partners engaged in dialogue with respective governments and its agencies (Hocking et. al. 
2012: 39).  By contrast, the networked communication approach is derived from technological 
developments associated with the Internet and social media, as well as new forms of modeling 
relations in both the natural and social sciences: as Newman et. al. (2006: 1) have argued 
‘networks are everywhere … the imagery of the network pervades modern culture’.  
 
The sociologist Manuel Castells has contributed a highly influential series of works on the 
network society as ‘the social structure characteristic of the Information Age’ (Castells 2000: 
5) where: 
 
The diffusion of Internet, wireless communication, digital media, and a variety of tools 
of social software has prompted the development of horizontal networks of interactive 
communication that connect local and global in chosen time … [and] people (the so-
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called users) have appropriated new forms of communication … [and] built their own 
systems of mass communication (Castells 2009: 65).  
 
For Castells, network communication gives rise to new modes of mass self-communication, It 
is mass communication as ‘it processes messages from many to many, with the potential of 
reaching a multiplicity of receivers, and of connecting to endless networks that transmit 
digitized information around the neighbourhood or around the world’, but is also self-
communication because ‘the production of the message is autonomously decided by the 
sender, the designation of the receiver is self-directed and the retrieval of messages from the 
networks of communication is self-selected’ (Castells 2012: 6-7).  
 
A key implication of network communication models is that it is increasingly difficult for 
central agents, such as national governments, to control communication networks or to 
manage information flows. As Castells argues, ‘mass self-communication is based on 
horizontal networks of interactive communication that, by and large, are difficult to control by 
governments or corporations’ (Castells 2012: 7). At the same time, public diplomacy theorists 
such as Cull have argued against a negative or ‘defeatist’ perspective on networked 
communication, arguing that new media technologies can ‘not only wrong-foot the powers-
that-be’, but can ‘create more opportunities … for public diplomacy, especially if the public 
diplomat is mindful of … the necessity for thinking in terms of building relationships’ (Cull 
2008: 53). Cowan and Arsenault have identified network communication as enabling ‘a third 
form of engagement’ based around ‘collaboration—defined … as initiatives in which people 
work together on a joint venture or project—[as] an equally critical and, in certain cases, more 
effective approach to engaging with foreign publics’ (Cowan and Arsenault 2008: 11). 
Similarly, Hocking (2008: 74) has argued that since 21st century public diplomacy is 
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‘conducted in an environment where national and international knowledge networks are 
proliferating’, there is a need for those engaged in public diplomacy to know ‘how to connect 
to them, build alliances, and utilize these networks to exercise effective advocacy in support 
of policy objectives’ (Hocking, 2008: 74).  
 
Advocates of networked approached to public diplomacy, such as Zaharna (2010, 2012), have 
associated a network communication approach to public diplomacy with three inter-related 
dimensions: network structure; network synergy; and network strategy. Network structure is 
about facilitating message exchange and information flow, because networks can enhance the 
flow of information and therefore increase the overall effectiveness of the whole network. 
Network synergy is concerned with the building of relationships and incorporating diversity 
into the network. Synergy occurs when individual efforts of the network members are 
combined as a force multiplier: the whole becomes greater than the sum of its parts. This 
happens through the combined processes of cultivating relationships and incorporating 
diversity in two ways. Firstly, internal relationship building through bonding among network 
members helps to transform a loose group of individuals into a dynamic team. Secondly, 
external relationship building, through bridging, is about coalition building that expands the 
network’s resources and reach. This internal and external relationship building not only 
incorporates diversity, but also generates synergy. Finally, network strategy focuses on 
bringing together the diverse elements of the network in such a way that a shared narrative 
can emerge, not as a top-down construction, but out of processes of co-creation of knowledge 
(Castells 2005). In this regard the strategy generates appeal and momentum in order to engage 
and retain network members, attract new members, and hence enable the network to grow.  
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Chinese Public Diplomacy and the Growth of Confucius Institutes  
 
Confucius Institutes became a central part of Chinese public diplomacy initiatives in the early 
2000s. In 2004, the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban), an 
organisation under the authority of the Chinese Ministry of Education, began to set up 
Confucius Institutes around the world. According to the General Principles of the Constitution 
and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes: 
 
Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people from 
different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to 
enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture by these peoples, to 
strengthening educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and 
other countries, to deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting 
the development of multiculturalism, and to construct a harmonious world (Hanban 
n.d.).  
 
Confucius Institutes have been among a number of initiatives undertaken by the Chinese 
government in the 2000s to enhance its international standing through public diplomacy. 
Observing that ‘communications capacity determined influence’, Li Changchun, the Chair of 
the Propaganda Committee of the CCP from 2008 to 2012, argued that: 
 
Strengthening the setup of our domestic and international communication capacity 
(jiaqiang guonei guoji chuanbo nengli jianshe) is related to the overall situation of 
China’s reform and opening up and modernization; it is related to China’s 
  
 
14 
international influence and international status (woguo de guoji yingxiang he diwei); it 
is related to the upgrading of our nation’s cultural soft power (woguo wenhua 
ruanshili de tisheng) and the role of our nation’s media in the international public 
opinion structure (woguo meiti zai guoji yulungejuzhong de diwei he zuoyong) (Li, C. 
2008).  
 
Among the range of other public diplomacy and international communication initiatives 
undertaken by China during the 2000s were: 
 
• Development of the English-language CCTV International 24-hour news channel, as 
well as channels broadcasting in French, Spanish, Russian and Arabic languages 
(Rawnsley 2012; Huang 2012);  
• China Radio International (CRI) now broadcasting in 59 languages worldwide; 
• Xinhua News Agency expanding its international news agency services, and providing 
subscribers with news in eight languages, as well as having over 1000 correspondents 
in 180 bureaus worldwide (Xin 2010; Wang D. 2012);  
• Support for Chinese Culture Centres Abroad, as well as cultural exchange programs, 
including China Culture Years, such as the ‘Year of Chinese Culture 2011-2012’ in 
Australia, and the ‘Year of Chinese Culture’ in Germany in 2012, both sponsored by 
the Ministry of Culture; 
• International education exchange initiatives, including rapid expansion of the role of 
the China Scholarships Council (CSC) in promoting Chinese doctoral study abroad, 
and the China Education Association for International Exchange (CEAIE) promoting 
student and academic exchanges.  
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In terms of their fundamental tasks and services of teaching language and culture to people in 
other nations, Confucius Institutes are comparable to international agencies such as The 
British Council, Alliance Française, the Goethe Institute and Spain’s Alliance Cervantes. 
These institutes typically address a mainstream public audience that normally does not have 
any special knowledge about the country in question, through activities such as language 
courses, cultural events such as exhibitions and screenings, and public talks (Hartig 2012). 
Some debate exists as to whether Confucius Institutes are appropriately seen as being 
involved with the projection of Chinese soft power. As noted earlier, there also exist concerns 
about whether they constitute a threat to academic freedom.  Paradise has noted that ‘as 
Hanban and other education officials ventured out into the world, they found some resistance 
to the idea of setting up Confucius Institutes on university campuses because of concerns 
about Chinese interference in foreign academic life’ (Paradise 2009: 659). 
 
One important structural difference between Confucius Institutes and similar European 
institutions is their decentralised organisational structure. Rawnsley (2009: 285) points out 
‘Confucius Institutes are joint ventures, are located within a university, and the partner school 
in China sends teachers to participate’. This differs from the European institutes, which are 
typically stand-alone entities supported entirely by their home governments. Entities such as 
the British Council or Germany’s Goethe Institute operate on the basis of a hub or star 
network, where network members communicate through a central position or hub which, as 
Zaharna (2010: 99) has noted, ‘effectively controls the exchange of information’. The center 
of the network – the London headquarters of the British Council or the Goethe Institute 
headquarters in Munich – provides leadership, develops structures to plan and coordinate 
work, recruits and manages members, solicits funds, and channels resources. Confucius 
Institutes, by contrast, are most often a partnership between the Hanban, a Chinese university 
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and a foreign university, where the Chinese side normally offers teaching materials, language 
teachers, a co-director and a share of the budget, while international partners provide facilities 
and local staff, as well as contributing to overall funding (Hartig 2012). It is this aspect of 
Confucius Institutes as involving cooperative arrangements between Chinese and international 
partner organizations that is unique and important in terms of considering network approaches 
to public diplomacy.  
 
Drawing upon Zaharna’s (2010) three-fold typology of networked approaches to public 
diplomacy, we can evaluate Confucius Institutes in terms of their approaches to network 
structure, network synergy and network strategy. Confucius Institutes have been described as 
as ‘a highly networked public diplomacy initiative’ (Zaharna 2010: 208), and their 
organizational distinctiveness as compared with the European cultural institutes has been 
noted above, particularly in relation to their active engagement of host country institutional 
partners. This analysis draws upon empirical case studies obtained through field research in 
Australia and Germany over a period from 2009 to 2012, and the aim here is not to discuss 
differences between Confucius Institutes in different countries in depth, but to provide a 
mapping of their operations on the ground as viewed through the tripartite formation of 
network structure, synergy and strategy.  
 
The network structure of Confucius Institutes 
 
Confucius Institutes appear at first glance to take a similar hub-and-spoke form to comparable 
cultural organizations, with Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters) in Beijing as the hub 
and the individual CIs around the world as the nodes. In this structure, Hanban is responsible 
for circulating and exchanging information and for coordinating and monitoring relevant 
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information across the distributed network of individual institutes. In the case of CIs, however, 
this simple hub-node structure is complicated by the joint venture structure involving foreign 
universities, so that the network becomes a potentially multi-directional one, complicating the 
flow of information from the hub to the nodes.   
 
One way in which the resulting communication challenges are addressed is through regional 
and global Confucius Institutes Conferences. The first global CI conference was held in 2006 
in Beijing, and these have become annual events held in December for individual CI Directors 
to ‘meet like-minded others, share experiences, and exchange ideas … represent[ing] the 
addition of direct interpersonal communication in a global stakeholder engagement process’ 
(Zaharna 2012: 11). Through such events Hanban serves as an indirect link for CIs around the 
world to connect with each other. One Australian director observed that ‘even though there is 
a lot of Hanban in [these conferences], there is on the sideline a lot of opportunity for the 
directors to talk to each other’ (I-A1), while a German director has described the annual 
conferences as a ‘mini version of the United Nations’ (I-G1). At the 8th annual conference in 
2013, for example, there were over 2,200 attendees from over 400 Confucius Institutes in 
attendance. 
 
While Hanban can spread and collect a lot of information via these conferences, the flow of 
information from the hub to the nodes on a daily or regular basis does not work that smoothly 
(Hartig 2012: 264). One Australian interviewee complained that ‘[w]e don’t ever really 
receive any communication about the status of our applications and the timeframe for 
receiving our funding. That makes trying a program, trying to stick to a budget more 
complicated than it needs to be. Practically speaking, this is quite a challenge’ (I-A1). In the 
Australian case, it was also notable that different CIs had asked in various internal documents 
for better and more frequent communication and better guidance from Hanban in relation to a 
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range of operational matters. Reports from the 6th Confucius Institute Conference held in 
Beijing in 2011 reveal that the newly-established La Trobe University Confucius Institute 
sought ‘more guidance from Hanban, and [to] share experiences and lessons with other 
Confucius Institutes’, while the University of Queensland Confucius Institute asked for 
continued support from Hanban for its programs and activities, such as research internship 
study tours to China, and CI fellowships to support staff exchange between the university and 
China (CICRM 2011). 
 
Zaharna is correct pointing out that theoretically there is an intensive inter-weaving of 
relations because international partners are not only linked to Hanban and their Chinese 
counterparts, but also to other CIs in their home country or to other international organizations 
as they may have the same Chinese partner. For example, the CI at Heidelberg University in 
Germany has the same Chinese partner university as the CI at the University of New South 
Wales, namely Shanghai Jiaotong University. Similarly, the CI at the University is Sydney is 
partnered with Fudan University in Shanghai, as are the CIs at Frankfurt University and 
Hamburg University. At the same time, interviews with CI Directors suggest that this has not 
necessarily led to more intense communication or even exchange or cooperation between 
Confucius Institutes. One Australian CI Director described the process as follows: 
 
We are talking to each other, complaining about what’s going on. We are having the 
same kinds of challenges in some way or the other. There is a little bit of networking, 
a little bit of knowing each other, and thinking of each other every now and again does 
pay evidence. It does happen, but on a fairly low-key kind of basis. (I-A1)  
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Another interviewee explained that ‘there is no formal structure for institutes to work together 
and cooperate. It is happening more on a personal basis’ (I-A2). Examples of collaboration 
identified by interviewees in Australia and Germany included common invited speakers (I-A2, 
I-A3, I-G2) and, in the case in Germany, a punk rock band to perform at two Institutes (I-G2). 
In Australia, some coordination happens in cities with more than one Institute in order to 
avoid competition and promote cooperation between individual institutions but, once again, 
this is not proposed by Hanban, but occurs more organically because key local personnel 
know one another and coordinate activities.  
 
It can be said, then, that the overall structural setup of the CI project has the potential to make 
these institute a prime example of networked public diplomacy. In reality, however, a number 
of circumstances prevent the network structure to unfold its full potential. First of all, the CI 
network is simply too big: by the end of 2013, there were 440 Confucius Institutes and over 
640 Classrooms all over the globe. As a result, Hanban has ongoing problems with 
disseminating information to all network nodes appropriately. Second, the CI network is more 
complex than similar organisations as its individual nodes are more complex due to the inbuilt 
cooperation between Chinese and international partners. If this cooperation functions well, 
this contributes to the overall network of CIs; if there is limited cooperation between the two 
partners (for example because the local and the Chinese co-director do not get along well with 
each other), this weakens the individual institute and thereby the whole network. Third, as 
there is no institutionalized mechanism to bring the nodes together except the annual world 
conferences and more irregular regional conferences, the capabilities of this network 
potentially get lost.  
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The network synergy of Confucius Institutes 
 
One of the perceived benefits of network structures is that they can enable network synergies 
to emerge. Network synergies are defined as arising from the interaction or cooperation of 
two or more elements in a network to produce a combined network effect that is greater than 
the sum of the individual parts (Newman et. a,. 2006: 234-36). For network synergies to 
emerge, one would expect to see evidence of: (1) building relations within the network; (2) 
building relations outside of the network, as others are attracted to the network which should 
incorporate diversity into the network (Zaharna 2012). With regard to building relations 
within the network, CIs can engage in internal bonding and team building, as they are 
involved in both teaching and cultural activities.  
 
Looking for the potential synergy effects, the cases of CIs in both Australia and Germany 
illustrate important limitations. In some instances, the scope to achieve synergies arising from 
the pairing of language teaching and cultural activities is undermined by particular Institutes 
not offering both these activities. At least two Australian CIs did not offer their own language 
courses and saw their role more as a facilitator for other organizations to teach Chinese, either 
their own university or schools in the surrounding community. Moreover, many of the 
Chinese teachers and co-directors only stay for short periods of one to two years, which 
hampers ongoing team-building opportunities. 
 
More generally, while network members contribute to relationship building and thus 
strengthen the network in most CIs, it is however not found in every single institute. In 
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Australia, we found that not all CIs had language teachers sent from China at the time of the 
interviews, and some CIs not having a Chinese co-director (I-A4, I-A3, I-A5), while in 
Germany there was at least one institute which had a Chinese co-director only located in 
China (I-G5). This lack of dispatched staff from China clearly limits the synergy potential of 
individual institutes. Another aspect limiting the synergy effects became obvious in Germany 
where not all teachers from China spoke German (I-G3, I-G2), which again would negatively 
influence the assumed possibility of network synergy. The difficulties in achieving 
cooperation with outside organisations because of cultural differences was noted at the 8th 
Global Creative Industries Conference in December 2013 when Xu Lin, the general-secretary 
of Hanban, pointed out that about 110 CIs do not hold the required annual Board of Directors 
meeting, and that various Chinese co-directors complained about their personal situation 
abroad, mainly due to a lack of communication with local directors.  
 
With regard to building external relationships, a particularly important issue for CIs has been 
to establish links to local communities. We found some evidence of this from case studies in 
Australia and Germany, with Confucius Classrooms being developed in cooperation with 
local schools, as well as enrolment in Confucius Institutes courses by interested public from 
the community, as well as staff and students form the host institutions. Another important set 
of external relations were with local businesses, and CIs in Australia had developed tailored 
language courses for business people (I-A3), and also worked with local companies to be 
external sponsors for their programs (I-G2, I-A3).  
 
The network strategy of Confucius Institutes 
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The third dimension of the network communication approach concerns network strategy, or 
the co-creation of credibility, master narratives and identity. One of the fundamental 
differences between the mass communication approach to public diplomacy and the network 
communication approach is that the first ‘begins with a pre-determined message’ whereas the 
latter ‘ends with the message or story’ (Zaharna 2010: 111). In this setting, ‘networks first 
establish the structure and dynamics for effective communication channels, then members 
collaborate to craft the message. Because the message or story is co-created across cultures, it 
is not tied to any one culture. Rather than acting as a barrier or impediment, culture is 
incorporated into network dynamics and becomes a rich source of team-coalition synergy’ 
(Zaharna 2010: 111 – emphasis in original). 
 
It is precisely this assumption that networks may refine overall public diplomacy ‘messages’ 
that is of importance in the study of Confucius Institutes. Recalling that it is not enough 
simply to have a network of cultural institutes that disseminate top-down communication 
determined message from a central headquarters, there has to be a structure that enables 
collaboration in order to more effectively craft messages. This makes it important to study the 
joint-venture structure of CIs, which makes CIs a prime example of collaboration in public 
diplomacy, defined as ‘initiatives that feature cross-national participation in a joint venture or 
project with a clearly defined goal’ (Cowan & Arsenault 2008:10). 
 
Having both local staff and staff dispatched from China, Confucius Institutes are theoretically 
predestinated to establish the structure and dynamics for effective communication channels 
with members collaborate to craft the program, and thereby the message, of individual 
institutes which is co-created across cultures. When a CI is in the position that is has both 
local and Chinese staff who work together very well, this cooperation helps to set up an 
appealing program with a variety of events and topics discussed. However, there are at least 
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two broad limitations here. First, as mentioned above, not all Confucius Institutes actually 
have staff dispatched from China all the time which influences both the potential synergy 
effects within individual CIs but also the strategy. Taking this into consideration, it becomes 
clear that while Confucius Institutes have more potential to co-create a narrative than other 
comparable cultural institutes, what is also apparent is that this capacity very much depends 
on the actual situation on the ground. The fact that the CI network is still growing generates 
ongoing difficulties in resourcing individual CIs and in strategic coordination.  
 
The second limitation concerns the question of credibility with the messages coming from 
Confucius Institutes. While it is undoubtedly the case that CIs have the potential to emphasise 
the value of learning Chinese and getting in contact with Chinese culture, the aspect of being 
the leading Chinese language teaching institution needs clarification. Not all CIs actually 
teach Chinese, and those that do often experience practical issues related to teaching materials 
and methods which may hamper CI credibility. It can also be noted that in most major cities, 
Confucius Institutes are only one of a number of providers of Chinese language teaching. In 
these places CIs actually compete with sometimes long-established and well respected 
institutions in this field, and the fact that CIs are related to the Chinese government does 
frequently undermine their credibility, whether justified or not.     
 
The bigger issue in terms of credibility however concerns the content provided by Confucius 
Institutes, especially through non-language events. Next to their task of introducing Chinese 
language to people abroad, Confucius Institutes also introduce Chinese culture and provide 
information about China. In order to do this, Confucius Institutes offer various cultural classes 
such as paper cutting, cooking courses or calligraphy, and organise film screenings, song 
contests or seminars and lectures dealing with various China-related topics and issues. In this 
context, it is apparent that some topics, such as the future status of Taiwan, the Dalai Lama, 
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Falun Gong or the Tiananmen events of 1989 are normally off-limits for Confucius Institutes. 
As one Australian director put it, ‘There are no restrictions, but obviously if I would pay the 
Dalai Lama to come to Australia with Hanban money they would not be happy. You don’t 
have to be a genius to know that’ (I-A3). The statement that Hanban does not restrict the daily 
work is made throughout many CIs, and in general terms that is an accurate observation. 
There are, however, instances where Beijing’s long arm in form of local Embassies 
Consulates reaches for Institutes. In Germany, one director admitted that ‘Our independence 
is limited regarding precarious topics. If topics like Tibet or Taiwan would be approached too 
critical, this could be difficult’ (I-G2). Another director is sure that ‘as long as I don’t do 
anything anti-communist or pro Falun Gong, I don’t think my Chinese co-director would 
intervene in anything I do’ (I-G4).  
 
Conclusion  
 
There cannot be any doubt that public and cultural diplomacy have to be aligned with modern 
communication dynamics which favor horizontal, many-to-many relationships and exchange 
through networks, over one-directional and one-to-many mass communication approaches, 
where information was presumed to be sent to largely passive audiences in order to win their 
hearts and minds. Relational and networked approaches to public diplomacy clearly provide a 
new direction in this regard, however, as the case studies of Confucius Institutes illustrates, 
even these approaches are not a panacea. One promising way to go beyond top-down, one-
way mass communications approaches lies in the networked structure of Confucius Institutes, 
which requires the engagement of local stakeholders who can much better contribute to 
programs offered by CIs. Nevertheless, as pointed out, this innovative approach of 
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incorporating local parties is not automatically promising and in the case of China’s cultural 
outposts this is hampered by two broader sets of issues.  
 
On the one hand there are several practical components that limit the network dimension, 
including the outlined human resources issues that concern the network synergy or problems 
of teaching materials and methods affecting the credibility. On the other hand, there are 
limitations resulting from the political constitution of the Chinese state, which bear on the 
content of CIs and thereby also the credibility of the whole network. Although due to their 
unique structure one can describe Confucius Institutes as ‘the most open-minded institution 
China has ever had’ (Liu, H 2008:31), nevertheless CIs and people in charge are at times 
reminded that China’s overall public diplomacy system is still largely a state-centric endeavor 
and this innovative approach to include both local and Chinese staff in order to create a 
suitable program and narrative for these cultural institutes stretches its limits due to the 
authoritarian Chinese state which does not wish to discuss certain topics in public, a fact that 
partially affects the credibility of the whole project. And as credibility is an important source 
of soft power, as Nye reminds us (Nye 2004:106), this drawback cannot be offset by even the 
smartest approaches to public diplomacy.  
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Appendix 
List of interviewees  
Interview 
number  
Position and Affiliation Date of interview(s) 
I-A1 Director, Australian CI 20 April 2011 
I-A2 Director Australian CI 29 April 2011 
I-A3 Director Australian CI 12 May 2011 
I-A4 Director Australian CI 4 April 2011 
I-A5 Director Australian CI 2 May 2011 
I-G1 Director, German CI 13 December 2011 
I-G2 Director, German CI 30 June 2011, 12 January 2012 
IG-3 Director, German CI 16 January 2012 
IG-4 Director, German CI 27 October 2009 
IG-5 Director, German CI 11 May 2010  
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